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iPREFACE
This paper is one of a number of M.I.T. Energy Laboratory Working
Papers prepared as part of the Energy Laboratory project "Regulating the
Automobile." The project is supported by the Division of Policy Research
and Analysis of the National Science Foundation. Four efforts comprise the
project: (1) an analytical comparison of the three areas of automotive regu-
lation-safety, fuel economy, and air pollutant emissions; (2) an examination
of the politics of automotive regulation, focusing on why we regulate the
way we do; (3) a study of uncertainty in emissions regulation; and (4) an
analysis of the impact of the fleetwide fuel economy regulations on the
structure of the automotive industry.
The present paper was written in support of the comparison of regu-
latory regimes. The emphasis is on describing the automotive safety regu-
latory system--as it was instituted by Congress and has been administered
by the Executive Branch. Two aspects of the system, regulation and support
for research and development, are examined by looking in detail at two tech-
nological concepts, the air bag and the research vehicles. Some very
preliminary analysis of the system's handling of these concepts is pre-
sented.
Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed
in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the M.I.T. Energy Laboratory, the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, or the National Science Foundation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to present and make a preliminary analysis
of the role which the federal government has played in the development of mo-
tor vehicle safety and effects it has had upon technical developments in the
automotive safety field. The scope of this paper will be limited to motor
vehicle technology, rather than safety advances in the overall system of motor
vehicle transportation (which would include highway safety features).
Section 2 of this paper will be a chronological presentation of federal
motor vehicle safety legislation (1958-1976), and a discussion of the con-
stellation of events which surrounded the passage of this legislation into
law. Safety standards (regulations created under federal agency), as dis-
tinguished from public law (legislation passed by Congress and signed by
the President), will also be presented.
In Section 3 two features of the U.S. Government's automotive safety
program are presented and discussed in more detail. Each is an attempt to
stimulate innovations in passenger car safety, but through very different means.
In the safety vehicle programs--the Experimental Safety Vehicle (ESV) and Re-
search Safety Vehicle (RSV) programs--the government has funded R&D in an
attempt to bring about major changes in automotive safety technology. In
the air bag program the government has sought, by regulation, to force the
final development and actual adoption of a safety innovation.
Some preliminary conclusions concerning these programs are presented
in Section 4.
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2. FEDERAL LEGISLATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
The earliest legislation which called for motor vehicle safety require-
ments came under the Interstate Commerce Act. This Act provided for Secre-
tarial powers to establish "reasonable requirements" 1 for the safety f private
carriers of property by motor vehicle, and carriers of migrant workers.
In 1962, amidst widespread concern over brake fluid quality, Congress
pointed the general terms of the Interstate Commerce Act into a specific
safety domain by passing an act requiring that hydraulic brake fluid sold or
shipped in commerce for use in motor vehicles meet certain specifications pre-
2
scribed by the Secretary of Commerce. Although at the time this Act was
passed 27 states had legislation to protect motorists from substandard brake
3
fluid, only ten of these states were deemed to have "effective" laws.
In 1963 Congress passed a law designed to allay fears that the budding
demand for seat belts would result in improper, poorly made equipment.
Public Law 88-201 mandated that the Secretary of Commerce prescribed "mini-
mum standards" for seat belts (manufactured or imported) for use in interstate
4
commerce. In so much as Public Law 88-201 dealt with the constructional
quality of belts and related hardware, rather than with "such traditional
state matters as installation and use," the Senate Committee of Commerce anti-
cipated that it would "furnish a new area for effective federal-state coopera-
tion." 5
On March 2, 1966, President Johnson delivered to Congress a message on
transporation and traffic safety, together with the proposed Traffic Safety
Act of 1966. In his address, Johnson urged that the Secretary of Commerce
be given authority to determine necessary safety performance criteria for all
motor vehicles, as well as authority to expand federal traffic research pro-
grams, including the development of a national highway safety research and
-3-
test center. In response, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce held seven days of hearings, calling upon various distinguished
witnesses whose expertise was thought to be of the widest range within the
automotive safety field. The Committee was confronted with what they con-
sidered to be disturbing evidence "of the automobile industry's chronic sub-
ordination of safe design to promotional styling; and of an overriding
stress on power, acceleration, speed, and ride, to the relative neglect of
safe performance or collision protection."6
Federal standards for the safety of ships on the high seas antedated the
Civil War; federal standards for the safety of trains were established at the
turn of the century; and seminal standards regulating the aviation industry were
promulgated in 1926. Yet, prior to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966, the automobile had remained essentially free of regulatory
controls. When the Senate, by a 76-0 roll-call vote, passed the Safety Act, a
new era in regulatory politics had begun.
All safety legislation passed prior to the National Traffic and Motor
7
Vehicle Act of 1966 was effectively repealed by that Act. All legislation
enacted following the passage of the 1966 Act pursuant to, and consistent
with, the powers vested in that Act. Table 1 presents all major safety
legislation affecting motor vehicle design, performance and repair.
Out of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce hearings
emerged at least six separate but related issue-areas or domains for which the
government would be held responsible under the new Act: 1) the federal govern-
ment would be responsible for the "unconditional imposition" of mandatory
safety standards at the "earliest practical date" 8 to mitigate the highway
death and injury toll; 2) the role of individual states in setting standards
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would be consultative--the federal government must assume overriding respon-
sibility for defining the parameters of both its own and the states' role in
standard setting; 3) the federal government would develop a major independent
technical capacity, sufficient to perform comprehensive research on accident
and injury prevention, and adequate to test and contribute to the quality of
the automobile industry's safety performance--"a technical capacity capable
of initiating innovation in safety design and engineering and of serving as
a yardstick against which the performance of private industry can be measured;
and finally, a technical capacity capable of developing and implementing
meaningful standards for automotive safety";9 4) vigorous competition in the
development and marketing of safety improvements would be maintained;
5) mandatory procedures would be imposed toensure such notification of con-
sumers and correction of all safety-related defects; and finally 6) the
federal government would assume responsibility for providing adequate con-
sumer information so that the consumer might make more educated decisions
in evaluating the comparative safety of competing car models.
In drawing up these far-reaching regulatory guidelines, the Committee
remained acutely sensitive to the possible abuses of regulatory power inherent
in such legislation. Thus the Committee made it clear that it was not em-
powering the Secretary to take over the design and manufacturing functions of
private industry. Rather, the "Safety Act" was designed to further industry
efforts to produce motor vehicles which would be in the first instance not
"unduly accident prone", and perhaps even more significantly, vehicles which,
when involved in accidents, would prove crashworthy enough to enable their
occupants to survive with minimal injuries:
-7-
The Secretary could thus, for example, be concerned with the measurable
performance of a braking system, but not its design details. Such
standards will be analogous to a building code which specifies the mini-
mim load-carrying characteristics of the structural members of a building
wall, but leaves the builder free to choose his own materials and design.
Such safe performance standards are thus not intended or likely to stifle
innovation in automobile design. 10
Thus, with the passing of the Safety Act, a congeries of broad policy standards
were drawn up in the automotive safety area, to be applied to ongoing techno-
logical safety developments in both government and industry. Furthermore, as we
shall see, these guidelines would serve as a catalyst for technological change
itself.
In 1972 and 1973 the purposes of the Safety Act were furthered by the pas-
sage of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act amendments of 197211
12
and the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act of 1973.12 The former
public law expanded operational capabilities under the Safety Act of 1966 by
appropriating large sums of money, and also made provision for the Secretary
to exempt a motor vehicle from any motor vehicle safety standard established
pursuant to the Safety Act of 1966, if annual production levels were below 10,000
units, and if compliance would cause such manufactuers substantial economic
hardship.
Initial investigation of the issues prompting the consideration of the
Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act were undertaken by the Anti-
trust and Monopoly Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, in a three-
year study of automobile repair problems. During that study the Committee's
Chairman received more than 8,000 letters of c6mplaint from irate automobile
buyers who complained about the "fragility "13 of their cars. The initial
Subcommittee investigation disclosed that Americans spend an estimated $25-30
billion a year for automobile repairs. Various studies presented at the
-8-
hearings showed that an estimated $8-10 billion per year was being charged for
15
work that was never done, was unneeded, or was improperly performed. In
light of this and other evidence received during extensive hearings,
the Subcommittee extracted four basic consumer needs which it deemed worthy of
redress: 1) the need to reduce the incidence of property loss resulting from
motor vehicle accidents; 2) the need to foster competition between automobile
makers so as to promote the construction of safer, less fragile, and more
easily repairable motor vehicles; 3) the need to facilitate inspection and re-
pair of vehicles by encouraging their diagnostic inspection; and 4) the need
to prevent odometer tampering.
The Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act requires that federal
bumper standards be set in order to reduce damages and economic loss resulting
from automobile accidents. In addition, the law established an Automobile Con-
sumer Information Study to determine how to provide consumers with meaningful
information about the operating costs and safety characteristics of particular
vehicles, thereby encouraging automobile manufacturers to compete to produce
cars with operating cost and safety characteristics that exceed required
standards.
In Title I of the Act, economic loss resulting from accidents was to be
lessened by providing for the promulgation and enforcement of bumper standards
for all motor vehicles manufactured in, or imported into the United States.1 5
The Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act thus not only sought quali-
tative improvement of safety-related equipment which was part of motor vehicles
manufactured or imported into the United States, but simultaneously the Act
sought to implement a series of post-crash cost reduction measures, or measures
which prescribe:
-9-
a minimum performance standard established for the purpose of increasing
the resistance of passenger motor vehicles or passenger motor vehicle
equipment to damage resulting from motor vehicle accidents or for the
purpose of reducing the cost of repairing such vehicles or such equipment
damaged as a result of such accidents.1
The intent of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act was thus to
reduce accident-related costs normally absorbed by the consumer, whether these
accident-related costs be a direct result of damage to safety-related equipment
or not.
In addition to this regulatory authority regarding the setting of bumper
standards, the Secretary was also given investigative authority which might in-
directly influence motor vehicle design. The Secretary was directed and empowered
by the Act to investigate the damage susceptibility of passenger motor vehicles,
their degree of crashworthiness, the ease of diagnosis and repair of their
mechanical and electrical systems, and their operating costs relative to such
factors. Such information would thus be made available to the consumer, so that
he might make a more informed choice when purchasing an automobile and its optional
equipment. It may be noted within the context of the Act that "damage sus-
ceptibility" is defined as "susceptibility to physical damage incurred by a
passenger motor vehicle involved in a motor vehicle accident", and "crash-
worthiness" as "the protection that a passenger motor vehicle affords its pas-
sengers against personal injuries or death as a result of a motor vehicle
accident." 17
The Secretary of Transportation delegated his authority under the Act to
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), which has since
issued bumper damagability standards for all motor vehicles. The
standards require that passenger cars be able to meet specified damagability
criteria for impact with a fixed barrier in accordance with the procedures
-10-
outlined by the regulation.* 18
The latest piece of major legislation in the regulation of automotive safety
came in 1974, when both houses of Congress overwhelmingly repealed NHTSA Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 208 which called for a three-point lap and
torso belt with ignition interlock system, effective August 15, 1973.** In
offering the repeal amendment for the Senate (subsumed under S 3934, the Federal
Aid Highway Amendments of 1974), James L. Buckley of New York echoed the senti-
ments of many Congressmen, stating: "I recommend the use of seat belts but I
strongly condemn the administrative mandate of an interlock which forces us to
use them...I view such coercive measures...as an intolerable usurpation by govern-
ment of an individual's right under the guise of self-protection Character-
istic of the press reaction was an editorial published in Fortune describing
the interlock as "a result of technocratic tunnel-vision that seems to afflict
some officials at NHTSA." With the interlock, said the editorial, the citizen
has to pay to be annoyed." 20
*As NHTSA is the motor vehicle safety standard-setting body, its power vis-a-vis
the automotive industry has accumulated rapidly as the safety standards it has
mandated have proliferated. Under Title II, Section 201 of the Highway Safety
Act of 1966, the National Highway Safety Agency was established under the aegis
of the Department of Commerce. As NHTSA's precursor, the National Highway
Safety Agency was headed by an administrator who was appointed by the President,
and held accountable to the Secretary of Commerce. The provisions of the 1966
Safety Act were to be carried out by the Agency, in consultation with the
Federal Highway Administrator. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion (NHTSA) was established under the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970, Title
II, as amended under Section 202 of that Act. The new administration (NHTSA)
was transferred to the Department of Transportation in 1970 and now acts under
the aegis of the Secretary of Transportation. NHTSA is responsible for all
matters pertaining to the design, construction, maintenance, and operation of
highways as well as matters pertaining to the safety of motor vehicles and
their operation.
**After attaching an amendment to H.R. 5529 (the Motor Vehicle Schoolbus Safety
Amendments of 1974), the House voted 339-49 to make such safety devices
optional.
-11-
In addition to suspending FMVSS 208, the Federal-Aid Highway Amendments of
1974 also required that the government hold public hearings before requiring
passive restraint systems (air bags) in cars. The Department of Transportation
was considering imposing such a requirement for model year 1974 automobiles
for that time.
Table 2 presents all safety regulations, with amendments promulgated by
NHTSA, as of this writing. The 100 series, "Accident Prevention Standards,"
contains twenty different sets of specifications designed to mitigate the pos-
sibility of accident through technically improved safety-related hardware. The
qualitative improvements called for by 100 series do not go beyond the state-
of-the-art. "Crash Protection Standards," contained in the 200 series, include
a number of requirements designed to protect motor vehicle occupants during the
crash sequence. As noted, bumper standards (FMVSS 205) were promulgated as a
result of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act of 1973. The
300 series, "Post-Crash Protection Standards," has only recently received a
great deal of attention from NHTSA, as requirements have been designed to
protect vehicle occupants immediately after the event of a crash impact.
-12-
Table 2
MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS PROPOSED OR PROMULATED BY NHTSA
Accident Prevention Standards
Reauirements Rffgzvt4 - Th!n+---c, (
Requires that essential controls be within
reach of a belted driver, and that such con-
trols have adequate identification.
Expands requirements of 101 and requires
illumination of essential controls.
Requires that transmission shift control
include "neutral" between "forward" and
"reverse," and that an interlock prevent
starting the engine in "forward" or
"reverse," and that engine braking be pro-
vided in one of the lower gears at speeds
lower than 25 MPH.
Requires that windshield defrosters and
defoggers be provided as standard equipment.
Expands requirements of Standard 103, calling
for high performance wipers.
Requires foot-operated service brakes and
parking brakes having specific performance
capabilities, a hydraulic brake failure
warning light, etc.
Specifies rigorous brake-hose capabilities
and procedures for brake-hose testing.
Requires that auto surfaces which may
reflect sunlight into a driver's eyes have
a dull finish.
Requires specified headlights, turn signals,
stop lights, back-up lights, side parker
lights and reflectors, hazard warning signals
etc. With amendments significantly improving
equipment effectiveness and reliability.
Requires rigorous tire performance capabili-
ties and uniform labeling.
Specifies requirements for tires and rims
as new car equipment.
Jan. 1, 1968
Jan. 1, 1972
Jan. 1, 1968
Jan. 1, 1969
Jan. 1, 1969
Jan. 1, 1968
Jan. 1, 1968
Jan. 1, 1968
Jan. 1, 1973
Proposed, 1976
Jan. 1, 1968
Jan. 1, 1968
Standard
Number
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
- - -
- - ____ --- - - - - - - - - I - 1;:1 k ;;, j
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Table 2 (continued)
Requirements
Requires rear-view mirrors with unobstructed
field of view. Amended to minimize the
effect of in-vehicle structures.
Requires "fail-safe" operation of headlight
concealment devices.
Requires double latches on certain types of
hoods which may be susceptible to inadvertent
opening.
Specifies requirements for theft protection
to reduce the incidence of accidents result-
ing from unauthorized use of motor vehicles.
A key interlock system must be provided
whereby removal of key will prohibit activa-
tion of vehicle and steering.
Requires vehicle identification numbers be
affixed to each car.
Requires specific hydraulic brake fluid
capabilities.
Updated version of 116, a more rigorous
standard.
Specifies performance and uniform labeling
requirements for re-treaded tires.
Requires that key be in ignition for the
operation of power windows.
Effective date(s)
Jan. 1, 1968
Proposed, 1976
Jan. 1, 1969
Jan. 1, 1969
Jan. 1, 1970
Jan. 1, 1969
June 3, 1963
March 1, 1972
Feb. 1, 1971
Crash Protection Standards
Requires that upon crash impact compartment
doors remain closed, requires padded
interiors.
Requires effective head restraints.
Requires energy-absorbing steering columns.
Specifies requirements limiting the rearward
displacement of the steering control into the
passenger compartment to reduce the likeli-
hood of chest, neck, or head injury.
Jan. 1, 1970
Jan. 1, 1969
Jan. 1, 1968
Jan. 1, 1968
Standard
Number
111
112
113
114
115
116
116a
117
118
201
202
203
204
|- --l ---
= . .
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Table 2 (continued)
Requirements
Specifies glazing material for windshields
and windows.
Enumerates requirements for door locks,
latches, and hinge systems.
Specifies seat anchorage capabilities.
Requires lap belts or lap/shoulder belts for
each passenger seat. Requires three point
lap and torso belts in front seats together
with a warning system. Requires lap and
shoulder belt with ignition interlock in
front seats. Requires passive restraints
for all seats. Repealed.
Sets performance capabilities for seatbelts
and related assemblies.
Sets performance standards for assembly
anchorages.
Protects pedestrian by prohibiting wheel
projections.
Specifies windshield mounting requirements.
Specifies child seating systems.
Specifies side door strength capabilities.
Requires front bumpers that will withstand a
5 MPH crash, and rear bumpers that will
withstand a 2-1/2 MPH crash. Requires both
front and rear bumpers to withstand 5 MPH
crashes. Requires protection of non-safety,
as well as safety components. Also specifies
bumper height requirements for standardiza-
tion.
Requires minimum roof strength capabilities.
Effective date(s)
Jan. 1, 1968
Jan. 1, 1968
(autos), Jan.
1972 (trucks)
1,
Jan. 1, 1972
Jan. 1, 1972
Aug. 15, 1973
Aug. 15, 1975
Dec. 18, 1974
March 1, 1967
Jan. 1, 1972
Jan. 1, 1968
Jan. 1, 1970
Jan. 1, 1971
Jan. 1, 1973
Sept. 1, 1972
Sept. 1, 1973
Feb. 27, 1975
Jan. 1, 1972
Aug. 14, 1977
Standard
Number
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
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Post-Crash Protection Standards
Requirements
Requires integrity for fuel tanks
and related equipment.
Limits the flammability rate of ve-
hicle interiors.
Effective Date(s)
Jan. 1, 1968
Sept. 1, 1973
Standard
Number
301
302
.|
-------
-
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3. FEDERAL ATTEMPTS TO STIMULATE SAFETY INNOVATION
Consistent with the guidelines established in the Safety Act of 1966,
NHTSA established a series of objectives which thrust both the development
of an Experimental Safety Vehicle (ESV) and the air bag to the fore. The fol-
lowing sections of this paper will trace the development of such safety inno-
vations while highlighting reasons for critical priority-setting changes by
NHTSA in these two key areas of technological concern.
3.1 The Safety Vehicle R&D Programs
When, after much initial resistance, it became clear to the automobile
industry that passage of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
was imminent, the industry's first reaction was to grant large sums of money towards
safety research. By April, 1966, General Motors has granted M.I.T. $1 million,
Ford established plans for a multi-million dollar research center in Dearborn,
Michigan, and in a united effort, the industry gave $10 million to the Univer-
21
sity of Michigan for research in automobile safety. As consistent with the
intentions of the Safety Act, however, NHTSA began its own research program
and attempted to establish its role as an independent and objective research
organization.
The early federal (NHTSA) regulations had one essential characteristic:
"They represented state-of-the-art industry practice. They were easy to meet,
and the vehicle design changes required by them were cheap and incorporable
22into production with only short lead time. However, the goals of the federal
government were soon to supercede the state-of-the-art. Research and develop-
ment thus became a paramount concern, and the Experimental Safety Vehicle (ESV)
program was the logical outgrowth.
-17-
Conceived under the 1966 Safety Act, the purpose of the Experimental Safety
Vehicle Program was "to test, on an experimental basis, new ideas of automotive
safety incorporated in a complete vehicle. " 2 3 The principal objectives of the
program were fourfold: 1) to demonstrate the "feasibility" of advanced auto-
motive safety performance by designing, fabricating, and testing experimental
vehicles; 2) to stimulate public awareness of safety and the economic ad-
vantages of advanced automotive safety design; 3) to apply program results
to the formulation of new or improved motor vehicle safety standards; and 4) to
encourage the automotive industry to increase and speed up its efforts in auto-
motive safety research and development.2 4
The program began in 1968 when three contract studies investigated feasible
approaches to applying the "total systems engineering concept" to the develop-
ment of an experimental safety vehicle (such a concept had previously been
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applied by the aviation industry to the design of safety aircraft). Stated
contractor Fairchild-Hiller:
The criteria for experimental safety cars can be realistically defined
only as part of an overall systems concept for safe human transportation.
The concept must recognize the contributing roles of the driver, the
environment, and the vehicle in any accident situation. Each of these
factors can help to prevent accidents, and, when an Icident cannot be
prevented, help reduce the severity of the accident.
Between 1970 and 1971 the Department of Transportation contracted with
Fairchild-Hiller, American Machine and Foundry, General Motors, and Ford to build
prototype experimental safety vehicles of the family sedan type. The non-
automotive contracts were competitive in that the contractor which produced the
superior ESV would receive a follow-up contract for further ESV production
and design, while the General Motors and Ford contracts were non-competitive
and completed for nominal fees of one dollar each. The conclusions of the
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seminal studies, which were done under the above contracts, were to form the
basis for developing program objectives and prototype performance specifications
for the ESV.
Assessment of the four prototype vehicles was done by an independent
contractor in May and December of 1972, and July, 1973. By June, 1973, however,
the Department of Transportation announced, to the dismay of all contractors
involved, its decision not to build additional family sedan prototypes as
previously scheduled. The decision by NHTSA was attributed to its recognition
of the growing trend toward domestic use of smaller vehicles. Costs to NHTSA
of developing and testing the family sedan prototypes totaled $14.6 million
through fiscal year 1973, while an ESV evaluation project completed in the
latter part of that year totaled an additional $56,000.28
The four initial prototype vehicles were tested by NHTSA against a set of
total systems performance specifications and capabilities which stipulated
requirements in the areas of crashworthiness, accident avoidance, post-crash
factors, and pedestrian safety. The prototypes were viewed by NHTSA as a
moderate success in that all met or exceeded existing and proposed safety
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standards issued through mid-1970.9 The vehicles were especially successful
in the highest priority area of crashworthiness. 3 0
Under the ESV plan as formulated by Fairchild-Hiller, critical elements
of automotive safety were defined and organized into five major categories
*In addition to maintaining an ESV program in the United States, the
Department of Transportation was and is involved in an international pro-
gram under the sponsorship of NATO. Between 1970 and 1972 the international
program began under the guidance of the United States and West Germany, while
international experimental safety vehicle conferences have met yearly since
1971. The focus, however, has shifted away from the initial ESV concept.
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within which vehicle safety could be examined and evaluated as a total system.
These elements were: 1) accident avoidance, 2) crash injury reduction,
3) pedestrian injury reduction, 4) post-crash protection, and 5) non-
operating safety. As tested by NHTSA, ESV prototypes contained injury re-
duction specificiations requiring occupant survival without serious injury in
a variety of crash modes. Accident avoidance criteria requiring braking,
handling, and visibility specifications were met or exceeded, while post-crash
demands requiring improved levels of fire prevention and emergency escape were
also met. Fire prevention requirements, including fuel line and related sub-
system integrity, and pedestrian safety specifications, were seen to be suc-
cessfully incorporated in the Fairchild and all other ESV's.
The design of ESV's reflected new safety ideas, with materials and
processes within the current state of the art for fabrication-and test-
ing. The safety administration and its research and development efforts
in particular distinguished between two major systems to be simultaneously
developed--crashworthiness systems and operating systems. "Safety standards
applicable to crashworthiness systems establish requirements for optimum crash
and post-crash protection of vehicle occupants, pedestrians, and cyclists.
Safety standards for operating systems try to avoid crashes and to reduce im-
pact speeds when accidents occur."3 1 The parallel but interrelated pursuit of
these two sub-systems (crashworthiness and operating), and their unity in a
"total vehicle system," was the operational strategy of the NHTSA ESV re-
search program.
The program, however, was established not only to meet, through improved
efforts in research and development, extant NHTSA regulations through the pro-
duction of experimental safety vehicles, but the program also sought to influence
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the establishment of new safety regulations which may be applied to the mass
32
market vehicle. According to the General Accounting Office,32 the great
failure of the ESV program was NHTSA's inability to apply program results
to the formulation of new or improved safety standards. At the heart of this
failure lay, the GAO claimed, at least four contributing factors: 1) ESV proto-
types demonstrated higher levels of safety performance than required by NHTSA,
buy NHTSA's Research and Developmemt Office had not made "the necessary analyses
of test results to identify achievements that could be applied to safety
standards. Instead, the Office's efforts focussed on determining whether the
prototypes met performance specifications and on optimizing these specifications
toward the planned fabrication of additional vehicles;" 2) NHTSA did not have
a coordinated program plan for establishing safety standards which delineate
the research requirements for each standard, nor did it have an efficient mech-
anism by which periodic updates of the plan could be made possible; 3 3 3) a re-
view of selected research findings showed that many years had elapsed between the
completion of ESV-related projects and the formulation of safety standards;
NHTSA lacked the procedural speed necessary "to insure that the results of motor
vehicle safety research and development projects [were] promptly used to support
new or improved safety standards;" 34 and 4) the ESV program directed itself
toward the design and production of a relatively large, family-sedan type
vehicle--the very rapid and apparently unforeseen shift from such vehicles to
the more compact "economy" type automobile, made such research inappropriate.
The National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration was not unaware of
the deficiencies of the ESV program. By 1974 it actuated an important di-
rectional change focussing on a broader, more technically (though not admin-
istratively) ambitious concept with an extended time frame--that of the Research
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Safety Vehicle (RSV). "The objective of the Research Safety Vehicle project is
to provide research and test data applicable to automobile safety performance re-
quirements consistent with environmental policies, efficient energy utilization,
and consumer economic considerations. 3 5 Unlike the ESV program, which sought
incremental safety-related changes through support of improved safety hardware,
the RSV is a program designed to operationalize a whole systems approach to
automobile design. Accordingly, it is recognized by both NHTSA and RSV con-
tractors that in the performance of RSV related research and development tasks,
contractors may introduce considerations and factors not currently utilized
or applied in NHTSA standards for automobile safety, while many factors ex-
tending well beyond a strict consideration of safety are to be investigated.
As such, the RSV program is a decidedly advanced state-of-the-art project
which seeks to provide major input for developing new safety standards for the
1980's, including damagability requirements conceived under the Motor Vehicle
Information and Cost Savings Act. It does not, however, like its precursor
(the ESV), attempt to influence near-term design changes for mass market
vehicles.
The overall RSV program is being implemented in a series of four
successive and distinct phases which take the following summary form. Phase I:
Begins with program definition, by identifying ranges of vehicle characteristics
suitable for an automobile that could be introduced by the mid-1980's, taking
into account causal accident factors, auto usage trends, driver population
trends and materials shortages. During Phase I (which officially began January
18, 1974) these data are being used to develop acceptable ranges for automobile
characteristics, including dimensional estimates, vehicle system characteristics,
and productability factors. A candidate vehicle made by the Chrysler
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Corporation was selected to provide 'Ta concrete basis" for further
evaluation, while preliminary design is currently undergoing advanced change.
The final part of Phase I calls for the development of a proposal for Phase II.
Phase II: Begins only after the successful completion of Phase I, and consists
of three interrelated parts--the performance of systems engineering and inte-
gration analysis, the development of a total vehicle design, and finally, the
development of a proposal for Phase III. Phase III: Consists of two stages--
the refinement and optimization of vehicle design established in Phase II, and
the fabrication of test vehicles. Phase IV: Is scheduled as the final stage
in the RSV program, intended to test and evaluate vehicles (anticipated to
be competitively awarded to a contractor other than those who may be awarded
either Phase I, II, and III).3
Calspan, contractor for the program, cites figures presented in the 1968
National Personal Transportation Study, and reported that it foresees no short-
term alternatives "to the passenger vehicle domination of the transport scene"--
a full 92% of all "person trips" were taken via automobile, taxi, or truck, while
only 8% of such trips were taken via mass transit, schoolbus, motorcycle or
37
airplane.37 Because of this finding and an expected greater emphasis on con-
servation and efficiency, it is believed that future automobiles will be designed
"more in relation to mission rather than apparent current American practice of
emphasizing appearance, style, status, etc."3 8 It is believed that this trend
will result in essentially two basic automobile types--the family car, and cars
designed for individual purposes such as shopping, commuting, etc. The develop-
ment of either of these two basic vehicle types will be pursued during Phases
II and III, although it is presently believed that the family type vehicle
(seating 4-5 persons) will receive priority.
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To be a viable program and provide impetus to mass market motor vehicle
design, the RSV project is intended to produce a vehicle which is basically
compatible with automotive mass production methods. The major requirement
satisfied by the Chrysler base vehicle was that it not exceed 2500 pounds in
weight, and that it be able to seat five. In addition, Phase I findings indicate
that as recycling is the key that best resolves that materials shortages fore-
cast by Calspan for the next 25-50 years, the following hypotheses will be taken
into RSV production consideration: 1) A high automobile replacement rate is con-
sistent with the necessity for a continuously improving fuel economy and asso-
ciated weight reduction; 2) a high replacement rate is consistent with evolving
engine technology; 3) recoverability of resources should be an automobile
design consideration; 4) it is appropriate to consider recycling technique
improvements as a legitimate part of the energy/ecology/economy/safety system;
and 5) radical departures from current material usage practices in automobiles
could lower resource recovery efficiency.3 9
The major "developmental effort" envisioned for the RSV is in the domain
of safety, particularly crashworthiness. A soft face bumper concept which will
improve damagability as well as provide pedestrian protection will be employed,
while the bodily structure directly behind front and rear bumpers will provide
energy dissipation during collisions. As of June, 1975, it was not known
what type of primary restraint system would be utilitzed, although it was cer-
tain that lap belts would be essential, either with or without air bags.
At this time it is not possible to evaluate the progress being made in
the technical developments of RSV's. It is clear, however, that the program
has received much greater care in its formulation and inception than that
of its precursor, the ESV.
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3.2 The Air Bag
Along with direct government R&D support (as with the ESV) regulatory
mandate has served as a catalyst for technological advance in automotive safe-
ty. The case of the air bag is perhaps the most interesting example. The
profound complexity of the air bag issue, however, both as a technological
quandry and as a potential imposition on the consumer-driver's life-
space, has created more problems than it has solved. Today, at least nine
years after the development of the device, the "great air bag debate" con-
tinues.
The modifications of FVSS 208 promulgated on October 1, 1971, required a
'passive restraint" system for all automobile occupants in all seats, effective
August 15, 1975. Although this standard has since been repealed, or rather de-
layed (as litigation and recent hearings have led both industry and government
to believe), the automobile industry and in particular air bag suppliers, have
expended great effort in perfecting the air bag apparatus.
The occupant restraint system is the most important element of the crash
40injury reduction system. Unless vehicle occupants are somehow restrained,
it is impossible to prevent serious injury even in relatively low-speed col-
lisions. Restraint systems are classified as either active or passive. An
active system, such as the seat (lap) belt, requires (by definition) some action
or initiative on the part of the occupant, while the passive system requires no
action by the occupant(s)--it deploys automatically under crash conditions.
The air bag is the most prominent example of a passive restraint system.
"A restraint system should be designed to minimize the crash-induced peak
deceleration force on the occupant. Ideally, the restraint system should
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utilize the available distance between the occupant's seated position and the
internal structure to decelerate the occupant, absorb his kinetic energy, and
prevent his striking the structure with injurious force."4 1 In order to ac-
complish this, the air bag must be rapidly deployed after an initial crash
impact. This rapid deployment implies a number of problems, some technological
and some socio-economic. The technological problems arise out of the complexity
of the device with "triggers" air bag deployment:
Porous cloth bags, normally folded and in containers in front of auto-
mobile occupant positions, are connected to manifolds through which
nitrogen or other gases can be admitted. Nitrogen is stored at about
2000 pounds pressure in flasks that are connected to the manifolds; in
addition, pyrotechnic gas generators are provided as supplementary sources
of gas to the manifolds. Sensors, which are expected to be integrating
accelerometers, are provided to determine whether an impact of potentially
serious magnitude occurs. When an impact above threshold is sensed,
valves are activated to release the stored nitrogen into the bags and,
when the impact magnitude exceeds a second, higher threshold, the pyro-
technic gas generators are also fired.4 2
The air bags are then filled with gas and deploy abruptly in front of the
vehicle occupants to cushion them and prevent them from striking the vehicle
interior. The entire process of sensing and inflation must take place in
about 55 milliseconds to protect occupants in a 30 mile-per-hour crash, as re-
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quired by FMVSS 208. 43 Aside from the inherent complexity of the device itself
additional problems occuring with sudden deployment are: 1) the creation of pressure
levels strong enough to spring doors and back windows, and 2) the accompanying
sound levels which may be injurious to occupants; seat belts would still have
to be worn. Other technological problems associated with use of the air bag are
*An additional observation to be made is that the air bag itself cannot provide
adequate side-impact and rollover protection, despite technical compliance
with FMVSS 208.
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the following: 1) out-of-position occupants would not be protected; 2) braking
prior to impact may thrust occupants forward and restrict deployment; 3) the
out-of-position child remains especially unprotected by the system; 4) in side
impact, intrusion could occur before, and interfere with air bag deployment;
5) the air bag could not reasonably be deployed below 10 M.P.H., a speed at
which serious injury may still take place; and 6) "inadvertent" actuations of
the air bag could be hazardous. 4 4
Especially problematic to production is insuring a system of quality
control and reliability. One industry specialist has pointed out that even
if 99.4% of all air bags did prove reliable, 66,000 automobiles per year
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would have defective equipment. This last "technological" problem brings
us into the realm of the socio-economic--lack of quality control and reliability,
which has created a great fear among manufacturers of liability suits. This
problem has already surfaced and is plaguing a program established by General
Motors, whereby automobile buyers paid at their own option to have air bags
installed in select new car models. Thus far four lawsuits among manufacturers
have actually been filed, the most prominent of which is an $8.3 million suit
filed by a Buick owner who alleges his air bag did not inflate in a near--fatal
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collision. Ten other lawsuits involving air bags are under consideration,
with plaintiffs trying to get out-of-court settlements. The ratio of law suits
to air bag deployments is so high that continuation of the option has been
ruled out by G.M.4 7
Other socio-economic factors which even further heighten the complexity of
the air bag issue are: 1) were the yearly fleet-of new automobiles to be completely
air-bag-equipped, the junking of worn-out automobiles would involve safely de-
,
As of 1976, there have been approximately 60 air bag deployments and about
12,000 sold.4 8
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tonating or otherwise disposing of the air bag activators--an expensive and
hazardous enterprise; 2) the cost of the air bag system is high--somewhere
49between $100 and $348; 3) the potential benefit of the air bag system,
using the "optimistic" predictions by NHTSA, is substantially less than the
potential benefit (as established) by experimental evidence) of 100 percent
50
usage of the three point harness system.
In May, 1975, NHTSA held its most extensive hearings on the air bag issue.
In five days more than fifty witnesses were heard. The automotive industry
remained, as it has for the past six years, adamantly opposed to the latest
NHTSA suggestion that passive restraints be included in all automobiles, ef-
fective 1977, while air bag suppliers, the insurance industry, Ralph Nader, and
former G.M. vice president John DeLorean urged NHTSA to mandate the air bag.
General Motors, which again publicized the failure of their own optional air
bag program, was the principal party to testify against such a mandate. In-
tense as these hearings were, conclusive evidence as to the desirability of
mandating the air bag was not received. Secretary of Transporation William T.
Coleman could only propose yet another one-year extension of the requirements
of the present standard.
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4. PRELIMINARY NALYSIS
In light of evidence presented in the foregoing two sections of this
paper, it is necessary to analyze the role of NHTSA as a federal regulatory
agency with respect to its treatment of the ESV program and of the air bag.
Rather than presenting a series of post facto alternatives, the writer would
like only to point out some of the salient characteristics of the regulatory
system, as it did behave.
4.1 The Safety Vehicle Programs
1) From its inception, the ESV program lacked a clear definition of
its costs, its lifespan, and most importantly, its goals. Did it, or did it
not intend to influence motor vehicle safety standards? While the program
claimed this as one of its fundamental goals, such an attempt was never clearly
made. Whether program results could yield applicable information is questionable.
as the program was geared not toward the marketable utilization of findings and
improved hardware, but toward a superior technological exemplar.
2) Whether it be from lack of systematic analysis or bureaucratic/human
oversight, the ESV project was unable to take into account the critical shift
toward smaller cars, publically cited by NHTSA as perhaps the most crucial
factor in the termination of the program. Again, as the program's functional
direction was one which aimed at the design and assembly of a super vehicle,
it did not adequately examine the whole constellation of macro socio-economic
factors (including public opinion) which inevitably influence the outcome of
such projects.
3) The program was unable to adequately and imaginatively evaluate the
advances that were forwarded by the ESV program in the making of federal
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regulatory law. While NHTSA officials were concerned with the application of
research findings to public safety, the sentiment was not so salient among ESV
technicians and engineers. This disparity of concerns among the principal actors
involved (administrators and technicians), led to discontinuities in the trans-
lation of technological change into regulatory mandate.
4) As expressed in the RECAT report prepared for the Office of Science
and Technology, there was a lack of procedural coordination between the regulatory
and research arms of NHTSA. This lack of coordination created a great time
lag between the completion of experimental research and its review for potential
utilization and application by the regulators at NHTSA.
NHTSA was not unaware of the difficulties which arose during the course of
the ESV program. Its reaction to such failure was one of tacit recognition,
followed by early abandonment of the project. The object-lesson was costly, but
NHTSA successfully made the transition to a broader, more meticulously planned
concept, that of the RSV. While the ESV program lacked self-evaluation,
the RSV phase-by-phase plan is replete with self-evaluation mechanisms.
Impetus toward the creation of the potentially promising RSV grew only out
of the apparent failure of its precursor.
4.2 The Air Bag
1) Over six years ago, in its evaluation of the air bag as a system of
passive restraint, an Arthur D. Little report stated "The concept is interesting
but must be developed further before its practicability can be determined. A
passive restraint system, one that requires no action on the part of the occu-
pants, may be a necessity if seat belt usage, as indicated by various studies,
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does not increase significantly. " 1 nThe call for more research has been the
shibbolith of those for and against the device, six years ago and today. While
automobile industry spokesmen claim that use of the device as currently developed
would be irresponsible--real fleet data is sorely needed--NHTSA officials seem
ready to accept the device as is. Yet they too concede that more "real" data
is needed. When will such data be collected and evaluated, and why was pre-
paration for the collection of such data not made in 1974 or 1975 when the MVSS
208 mandate was postponed and hearings held?
2) Rather than encouraging rapid technological development of the air bag
through monetary or other incentive; NHTSA sought technological development through
the promulgation of standards which required technological advance. In effect,
this legally mandated requirement was not encouraging, but coercive. By man-
dating FMVSS 208, NHTSA naively felt it could speed up technical accomplishment.
This did not occur.
3) NHTSA actually did promulgate regulations requiring passive restraints,
when in fact experimental evidence was inconclusive and almost completely
lacking. Had not litigation prevented the regulation from coming into effect,
hazardous and irresponsible conditions might have ensued.
4) While advocating use of the air bag system, NHTSA ignored its own
cost-benefit analyses which showed the three-point harness system to be
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a) equally if not more safe, b) more reliable, and c) more cost-effective.
One crucial problem it seems is that there is insufficient experimental evidence
to establish the true efficiency of the air bag system in preventing automobile
fatalities and injury--and at the same time, NHTSA has neglected to make pro-
vision for the obtainment of such evidence.
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5) As if Congressional and citizen outcry over the starter-interlock had
not occurred, NHTSA had ignored questions of public opinion. Until June, 1976,
prior to the release of Secretary Coleman's untitled Department of Transportation
53
report,53 consideration of philosophical problems concerning consumer freedom of
choice played no official role in NHTSA's decision to mandate passive restraints
(i.e., the air bag).
At least in the ESV safety vehicle domain, NHTSA has made substan-
tial accomodation to the tacit recognition of failure. In the domain
of the air bag, however, vivid memories of the starter-interlock debacle remain,
and administrators are operating with a necessary modicum of caution. Importantly,
public opinion will now be considered.5 4
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